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Abstract 
This paper aims to compile past research on the sovereign debt crisis as well as the 
formation and role of monetary unions, specifically optimal currency areas. It further analyzes 
the causes as well as possible future consequences for Greece and the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). It will provide a history of how Greece reached the debt levels it did and the measures 
taken by the EMU over the past decade. There are multiple responsible parties for the conditions 
that have prevailed in Greece. These parties include the investors in Greek assets, the EMU, and 
the rating agencies as well as the Greek government and Greek citizens.  
Investors have a responsibility to inform themselves of the economic and financial 
conditions of their investments; however, without the due diligence of the ratings agencies and 
with the corruption prevalent in the Greek economy, their job became exceedingly difficult. The 
European Monetary Union failed to monitor excessive deficit levels of member countries, but 
Greece also falsified its financials to allow for its admittance into the monetary union. The thesis 
further draws the connection between corruption, interest rates, and Greece’s debt accumulation. 
The excessive build-up of debt (that resulted in the sovereign debt crisis and collapse of the 
economy) was ultimately a result of the Greek government overspending to meet the standard of 
living expectations of Greek citizens.  
The primary consequences discussed are the results of Greece’s continued membership in 
the monetary union versus a possible “grexit” (Greece leaving the union). The hypothetical 
benefits and drawbacks to both options are evaluated. The thesis concludes with my 
recommendation for a focus on fiscal and political unity to reduce the probability that such a 
crisis will occur in the future. One of the fundamental reasons for the creation of the EMU was to 
promote a positive relationship between admitted countries, but the crisis has strained those 
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relationships. The only way to rebuild the monetary union is to understand what happened in the 
first place and implement future strategies to protect those relationships.  
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Part I: Introduction 
Όλα καλά (Ola Kala)! The translation of this phrase is “it is all fine” in Greek. Given the 
recent economic crisis in Greece, this is now unlikely said about the country. There have been 
numerous analyses on the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the factors that contributed to it. In 
short, the crisis resulted from certain Eurozone member countries’ inability to repay their 
accumulated government debt. The recession experienced by Greece as a consequence of its 
excessive debt compares only to that of the United States during the Great Depression, as seen in 
Figure 1. The literature to date on the Greek debt crisis focuses on the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), the situation in Greece leading up to and including the crisis, and the corruption in the 
Greek economy. Government corruption and tax evasion are two of the primary contributors 
toward Greece’s unsustainable lifestyle and its resulting high debt levels. Much of the research 
on the difficulties monetary unions face and the role corruption has on an economy was available 
prior to the crisis and could have served as warning signs of the potential problems for both 
Greece and the Eurozone as a whole.  
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Figure 1. Greece’s GDP compared to other areas during the economic crises in terms of 
their length and severity. GDP refers to Gross Domestic Product. Copyright 2015 by the 
Economist.com 
 
This thesis examines the negligence of the parties involved in fueling the Greek debt 
crisis. The parties evaluated include the investors in Greek assets, the EMU, and the rating 
agencies as well as the Greek government and Greek citizens. Investors continued to feed 
Greece’s debt habits because of either the assumed underwriting of the debt by the EMU or the 
overconfidence in Greece’s fiscal future. Many investors believed the EMU would assist any 
struggling country and prevent an economic crisis from forming. The EMU failed at effectively 
policing its member countries’ fiscal policy and adherence to the Maastricht Treaty. The lack of 
proper regulation resulted in a fiscal wedge forming between countries with more conservative 
policies, like Germany, and those countries with more liberal policies, like Greece. The 
increasing fiscal diversity between the countries has only worsened their ability to compromise 
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and unify in times of economic hardship, as observed with the current situation in Greece. Nation 
leaders and the EMU are not the only ones at fault for the severity of the crisis, the rating 
agencies have also played a role. Rating agencies are supposed to indicate the financial health of 
debtors; however, in the years leading to the crisis, they primarily focused on the political 
opinions expressed on Greece’s economic condition, resulting in long overdue and drastic drops 
in debt ratings that further intensified the crisis. Greece also failed to monitor and fix its 
corruption and overspending, primarily due to the example set by the Greek government and the 
lifestyle expected by the Greek citizens. 
Finally, whether Greece will remain in the Eurozone or be forced to leave will greatly 
affect the future of both the country and the European Monetary Union. Although Greece only 
makes up a small portion of the monetary union, what happens in the next few years in Greece 
could set a precedent for future policies and assistance given to other EMU countries 
experiencing similar economic troubles. One example is Italy, which also has high sovereign 
debt and the same corruption rating. The example set by the EMU in bailing out Greece, despite 
its fiscal irresponsibility and the risk associated with it, may result in other countries in the EMU 
taking similar risks and expecting the same protection. If this moral hazard problem were to 
arise, what has been a small-scale issue would instead become a debt epidemic within the EMU.  
The policy response by the EMU is crucial because many believe the euro may one day 
rival the dollar as the principal reserve currency and serve a growing portion of the world’s 
economic activity. In order to compete with the dollar as the primary reserve currency, however, 
four conditions would have to be met: The European financial markets would have to be liquid 
(with the euro able to be commonly and quickly exchanged), “deep” (large quantities of the euro 
can be bought or sold without drastically altering the value of the currency), maintain a stable 
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exchange rate, and the euro must be backed by a strong economy and a government that instills 
international investor confidence in its stability (Conerly, 2013). The Eurozone meets the first 
three criteria, but, with the events of the sovereign debt crisis, investor confidence has been hurt, 
the most damage resulting from the Greek crisis. The present condition in the Eurozone may 
make the United States dollar and the Chinese yuan more viable alternatives than the euro 
(Maverick, 2015). This only further exemplifies the importance of correctly evaluating the 
causes of Greece’s economic condition and how the EMU should respond presently and in the 
future in order to become a strong rival to the dollar.  
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Part II: Literature Review 
1. The Formation of a Monetary Union and the Role it Plays 
In June of 2012, Robert A. Mundell, referred to as the “godfather of the euro” for his 
advocacy of the Eurozone, said “the euro is more than just the icing on the cake on the single 
European market and the European Union (EU), it is the glue that keeps the core of Europe 
together” (Corcoran, 2012). This view perceives the euro as crucial to the political integration of 
Europe. In 1992, participating European countries signed the Maastricht Treaty to create what is 
now known as the Eurozone. The Eurozone is a monetary union: a group of countries under the 
same currency and monetary policy monitored by a single central bank. Although a monetary 
union is relatively easy to define, it is difficult to successfully implement. Currently the 19 
members of the European Union that are using the euro are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Denmark and the United Kingdom opted-
out of the treaty while others still wait to meet the criteria for admittance. These candidate 
countries are evaluated every two years by the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank on the following convergence criteria (“Who can join and when?”): 
 Price Stability: Consumer price inflation rate no greater than 1.5% points above the 
rate of the three best performing member states 
 Sound Public Finances: Government deficit no more than 3% of GDP 
 Sustainable Public Finances: Government debt no more than 60% of GDP  
 Durability of Convergence: Long-term rates no more than 2% points above the rate of 
the three best performing member states in terms of price stability 
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 Exchange Rate Stability: Participation in ERM 2 (Exchange Rate Mechanism) for at 
least 2 years without severe tensions 
 Integration: Adoption of the euro 
 Independence of National Central Banks: monetary policy by ECB is independent 
In 1997, five years after the treaty was put into place, the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) was signed by EU member states in order to monitor and enforce the debt and deficit 
criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty. The pact included two sets of rules, preventative and 
corrective. Prevention comes in the form of the Medium-Term Budgetary Objective (MTO), 
which is a target that holds members to Maastricht treaty agreements. Corrective rules come 
from the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which works to reduce excessive debt levels (levels 
exceeding the terms outlined above). The preventative rules were set into motion in 1999 and 
corrective rules in 2005, the second was especially prevalent with the Greek deficit uncovered 
the year before (2004).   
Countries joining the Eurozone have had many reasons to do so. A monetary union 
avoids many transaction costs such as that of converting currencies, thereby improving 
transparency and trade. A common currency also alleviates exchange rate risk. The elimination 
of exchange rate volatility for member countries promotes increased confidence in the stability 
of a country’s economy. Less risk results in a lower interest rate that sparks investment. 
Investment is the lifeblood of a country, but investment depends on the confidence in the future 
health of a country, including its currency.  
In a speech given to Tel-Aviv University in December of 1997, Robert A. Mundell 
contributed to the reasons to join a group of countries sharing a currency (currency area or 
monetary union). Possibly one of the most important reasons for a monetary union is the word 
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itself, “union”. Unity can act as a “catalyst for political alliance or integration,” which can help a 
world plagued by terror and distrust (Mundell, 1997). These alliances could also aid smaller 
countries in having their joint voices heard on an international scale. A country may additionally 
decide to join a union to remove the temptation to use primarily activist monetary policy to affect 
output, inflation, employment, and interest rates as well as to stabilize its exchange rate. A 
monetary union also allows purchasing power parity to hold more strongly between member 
countries. Purchasing power parity is an economic theory asserting that when two countries have 
equal purchasing power of goods, the exchange rates are in equilibrium (in the case of a 
monetary union, the only barrier to equilibrium price levels are any remaining transaction costs). 
It is found that this parity holds relatively well between developed countries, but is weaker 
between developing countries and those outside of a monetary union (Simonoff, 2015). These 
were all reasons many countries, such as Greece, decided to join the European Monetary Union. 
Although a monetary union creates many benefits for a country, inherent costs also exist 
with membership. Upon admittance to the EMU, Greece was aware of these costs. The loss of 
independent monetary policy is one of the central problems, especially when a number of 
countries are at different points in their business cycles and could benefit from this option when 
trying to ease economic difficulties. For example, asymmetric macroeconomic shocks to 
aggregate supply or demand, affecting only a subset of the monetary union, make stabilization 
policy difficult without the option of devaluing currencies. Easy money for that subset is no 
longer an option due to inaccessibility of monetary policy and countries experiencing negative 
shocks must endure internal devaluation (“classical medicine”). One form of internal devaluation 
would be reducing public sector wages, like Greece has done throughout the debt crisis. 
Problems with internal devaluation are the slowing of economic growth and increased 
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unemployment, further stalling recovery. Greece has struggled with both of these problems, as 
will be discussed in a later section. 
In any monetary union, the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation may arise, as 
Mundell discussed and the Phillips curve models (with respect to a single country). One country 
in the union can be booming with inflationary pressure from asymmetric positive demand 
shocks, while a struggling country faces rising unemployment. He elaborates that this principle 
does not apply to unstable or very large countries where there is no established international 
monetary system due to the difficulty in maintaining fixed rates. With flexible exchange rates, 
both countries would have the option to use monetary policy to alleviate these contrasting 
problems (ex: printing money), which is not the case if they are linked either by fixed rates or a 
monetary union. 
Without either fiscal coordination between countries or “cross-border (or country) 
compensation,” effective policy responses to asymmetric shocks in a monetary union are 
difficult or near impossible. “Cross-border compensation” was addressed with respect to the 
United States by Paul Krugman as the “automatic compensating transfer from the rest of the 
country” to support a region in need (Gilsinan, 2015). This is where the United States and the 
Eurozone differ, however. The United States is viewed as a nation state, where Federal programs 
are intended for all states. When a state is experiencing economic hardship, other states 
compensate by indirectly giving stimulus to the one that is struggling through the Federal 
government. This is primarily due to the equal dependence of the states on Federal programs 
supported by revenue from the states. This means that recessions in a given state hurt the whole 
country. The Eurozone, in contrast, is not a nation state with fiscal unity (a coordination of fiscal 
policies within the monetary union or a single fiscal policy applied to all members) and 
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expectations of such support. The lack of fiscal unity within the EMU is one aspect of the 
monetary union that has been challenged by economists in the midst of the economic hardships 
endured by certain countries in the EMU because of the sovereign debt crisis. The Eurozone is 
faced with the decision of whether or not to support Greece, one of the struggling countries, and 
the consequences that would follow.   
In the same 1997 speech, Mundell listed further reasons for countries, such as those 
within the United Kingdom, to decide against a monetary union. One reason is to allow 
flexibility for differing inflation rates. Another may be due to the added constraints on 
macroeconomic policy (coordination efforts and meeting budget, debt-to-GDP ratio and interest 
rate requirements). He ends his reasoning against the formation of a monetary union with the 
idea of integration. A country may be hesitant or even refuse to adhere to the common standards 
(treaty requirements) and fiscal policies of the rest of the area (referring to fiscal unity or fiscal 
coordination). This integration has been one of the primary struggles facing the Eurozone, which 
is composed of countries with diverse cultures and expectations of living standards. There are 
also the disadvantages not mentioned by Mundell, such as loss of the confidentiality of 
government statistics/data, difficulty in maintaining effective leadership and its resulting political 
instability, and difficulty in establishing confidence in the permanence of a balanced budget. 
A monetary union can be a powerful way to instill confidence in a body of countries and 
strengthen each member (through underwriting and coordination efforts), however for many of 
the reasons listed above (primarily the loss of independent monetary policy) it is better suited for 
countries fitting within an “Optimal Currency Area.” This idea was proposed by Robert Mundell 
in an article written in 1961, entitled “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas” (Mundell, 1968).  
Mundell went on to receive the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1999 for this theory, the same year 
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that 11 European countries adopted the euro. Mundell denies that the whole world would qualify 
as an optimum currency area, which would call for a single worldwide currency as favored by 
internationalists like economist John Stuart Mill (Mussey et al., 1909, p. 54). Mundell believes a 
world currency could be practical for the future world economy (in easing international 
transactions and, therefore, relations), but the current instability of the international monetary 
system, makes today’s world far from that point (Corcoran, 2012). He instead defines the 
“current optimal (currency) area” as an area with the “ability to stabilize national employment 
and price levels” (Mundell, 1968). Employment instability is especially prevalent in Greece 
which has the highest unemployment rate within the European Union with a rate of 24.6% as of 
October 2015, a large number of which are young adults (“Unemployment statistics”, 2015). 
Compared to the United States unemployment rate of 5%, as of November 2015, the euro area’s 
rate as a whole is double ("National employment monthly update”, 2015).  
Three of Mundell’s key points are as follows: Small countries within a monetary union 
require budgetary discipline and are likely to need fiscal unity with larger members due to 
different standards of living (generally higher expected living standards but lower means of 
attaining those standards, an example being Greece); the more countries included in a monetary 
union, the more insulation from shocks due to economic variety; and trading convenience can be 
found in areas with more countries through variety of product options without the hassle of 
exchange rate conversions. Greece’s lack of fiscal discipline leading to the debt crisis 
demonstrates the first point Mundell makes. The second point may have reduced the severity of 
the crisis, but has caused conflicts between political powers of different countries in the 
negotiation processes (e.g. Greece and Germany). The last point is not clearly visible in the 
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EMU, because although the euro eases trading, there is still an export/import imbalance between 
countries, making some thrive over others.  
An important factor influencing the relative advantages of an optimal currency area is the 
degree of factor mobility. Factor mobility concerns the ease at which labor, capital, and other 
factors of production can be transferred between countries. Mundell proposed a need for high 
levels of mobility in a monetary union, pushing the markets within the union into equilibrium, 
and low levels externally with other regions, to avoid an outflow of factors making the union 
unsustainable. The exact level of mobility required for optimality is disputed (especially with 
respect to its restriction on a country’s ability to tax those factors). Though in a later interview, 
Mundell clarifies that the advantages of information availability and diminishing transaction 
costs of a monetary union must overcome the problems of insufficient labor mobility (if they 
exist) for a monetary union to be preferable, noting that insufficient labor mobility is not the 
primary cause of the financial problems of Greece (Corcoran, 2012). 
Another problem addressed in Mundell’s writings was a contagion effect similar to the 
spread of the depression after 1929 that many economists believe resulted from the gold 
standard. “Under a common currency, depression in one region would be transmitted to other 
regions for precisely the same reasons (i.e., the reliance on the same medium of exchange)” 
(Mundell, 1968).  If the unemployment and other debt related problems experienced in Greece 
were to flood into other countries already struggling, it could lead to an economic collapse of the 
monetary union. 
Mundell did make some incorrect assumptions about the formation of the European 
Monetary Union, as did many economists at the time of its creation. Mundell believed that the 
United Kingdom would choose to join the EMU with the costs of opting out (foregoing the 
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benefits of the monetary union mentioned earlier) being as large as they were; however, it still 
chose to opt out. As for Greece, Mundell correctly anticipated its acceptance into the Eurozone. 
He did not, however, foresee its acceptance through the falsification of deficit records. There was 
not a “real effort to put other elements of its economic house in order,” a house that recently 
faced tribulations and was searching for the insurance of the monetary union (Mundell, 1997). 
Mundell proceeded to assert that if not accepted into the Eurozone, Greece should still have fixed 
the drachma to the euro with narrow margins and that the “more countries that join the bloc 
(EMU), the greater will be its chance of success” (Mundell, 1997). Only the aftermath of the 
crisis and the reactions of the monetary union as it learns from its mistakes will tell if Mundell 
was correct on his last point. 
Mundell is quoted as thinking of the euro as a political and economic triumph in 2012, 
well after the beginning of the Greek crisis. Despite the lack of fiscal policy harmonization, he 
stood by the assertion that the euro may one day replace the dollar as the international reserve 
asset. He went on to say that a “grexit”, although possibly disastrous for Greece, could indeed 
strengthen the union by cutting off the suffering entity and allowing for a quicker recovery for 
the monetary union. Mundell continues to discuss a necessary shift from nation-states towards a 
central power, with the European Commission as the executive power and the European Council 
as the legislative power. Mundell also argues that fiscal unity is not a prerequisite for a well-
functioning monetary union, referencing the United States and Canada as examples. He promotes 
the distribution of responsibilities (including fiscal policy, defense, and social security) between 
the European Commission (“federal power”) and the individual countries “on grounds of 
efficiency and economic justice, not on grounds that they are necessary for monetary union” 
(Corcoran, 2012). He effectively states that powers are assigned based on what is efficient and 
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effective for the unique area or country and are not based on a set of universal rules, one fiscal 
policy may not fit all members of the union. 
“The steps that are needed to resolve the crisis will move Europe toward a more perfect 
union,” Mundell wrote (Corcoran, 2012). This crisis has forced the EMU to work together 
toward future solutions and preventative measures (e.g. more restrictive regulatory enforcement 
by the SGP). A careful examination of the existing literature about monetary unions prior to the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1999 would have presented some of the warning signs of possible future 
distress and could have prevented some of the repercussions of the crisis. Slowly, the EMU may 
achieve “a more perfect union,” but for now they still have much to learn about the mistakes that 
were made and what parties made them.  
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2. The Situation in Greece 
Despite the warning signs that were present prior to Greece’s admittance into the 
Eurozone, Greece continued on a trajectory towards its current instability. The last year (2015) 
has included bailouts, referendums, elections, and bank shutdowns, but the circumstances Greece 
finds itself in cannot be explained solely by the events of last year, because it was the 
culmination of thirty years of fiscal irresponsibility and misplaced trust in the existing 
governance. Starting in late 2009, the sovereign debt crisis would begin to reveal many of the 
cracks already present in the decade old European Monetary Union.  
In order to truly understand the current situation in Greece, it is important to have a brief 
overview of what brought Greece to where it is today. Greece’s culture can be described as “laid 
back.” There is a strong focus on family, from children living with their parents until marriage to 
taking care of their grandparents regardless of the expense. Similar to a few European countries, 
Greeks would eat out regularly and rest after the big meal. They spent their money while they 
could still get good credit. Starting in the 1980s corruption bled out of the political system. The 
two major political parties (PASOK, the moderate left party, and New Democracy, the moderate 
right party) would direct government spending to benefit their supporters either through 
government jobs or in the private sectors (Mchugh, July 2015). Tax evasion also entered the 
scene as another way to line the pockets of the corrupt. Additionally, Greece’s media were 
“intertwined with the political structure, which prevented reporting of financial mismanagement” 
(Shorto, 2012). Not until the EMU was beginning to form did Greece have to acknowledge their 
excessive debt accumulation. Greece was not initially allowed to join the EMU. Only after policy 
revisions and deficit reductions were they allowed to join the monetary union in 2001. Along 
with many of the aforementioned reasons for joining a monetary union, Greece also sought the 
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lower credit terms linked to the euro. With such favorable credit after admittance, Greece quickly 
fell back into its earlier debt activities and corrupt practices. None of this is to say that Greeks 
are not just as hard working as other countries. In 2008 Greeks worked on average 1,000 more 
hours than Germans (Shorto, 2012). Greece just grew accustomed to borrowing and regularly 
refinancing their debt. The initial lower interest rates of the Eurozone lured them in, but when 
their debt was uncovered they became stuck in what is called a “debt-trap” (i.e., borrowing and 
acquiring debt to the point even more would have to be borrowed just to pay off the interest), 
which will be elaborated on in the section on corruption.  
Greece had been running deficits every year from the mid-1990s (“Greece Government 
Budget”, 2016). In 2004, Greece held the summer Olympics, adding another €9 billion to public 
expenditures and marking the most expensive Games to be held up to that point (Malkoutzis, 
2012). €7 billion was supposed to be supported by taxes, but consistent with Greece’s history of 
tax evasion, much of it was funded through additional borrowing (“Greece Crisis: How did It Get 
This Bad”, 2015). That same year (2004), Greece admitted to falsifying deficit information to 
enter the Eurozone with the help of Goldman Sachs through a series of swap agreements 
(Dunbar, 2003). There is still no agreement over how the debt was able to build up for so long or 
how Greece was able to keep it hidden so well even with help they received from Goldman 
Sachs. When the global financial crisis hit in 2008, banks began to restrict lending, forcing 
Greece to look to the European Union and the International Monetary Fund for support.  
In February of 2010, the first austerity plan for Greece was set in motion after facing 
pressure from both the EU and the European Commission. A freeze was placed on public-sector 
wages and taxes were increased. Just a month later, another fiscal package was approved by the 
European Commission, which consisted of even more public-sector pay cuts and tax increases 
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(VAT, consumption, and income). It came as no surprise that in the following two months S&P 
downgraded Greek government bonds to junk status and a €110 billion bailout package was 
agreed to by IMF and Eurozone leaders. Downgrades continued into 2011, resulting in Greece 
possessing the “world’s lowest-rated sovereign debt” (Ray, 2015). The year 2011 only produced 
further austerity measures and rescue packages. One package in particular was for €109 billion 
from European Union leaders in which existing loans were restructured with more generous 
terms for Greece. Greece was also labeled as being in “selective” or temporary default by Fitch 
as a result of their second bailout.  
A meeting of Greece’s creditors in 2011 set forth a series of bond swaps that would cut 
Greek debt in half by switching existing debt for new debt with half of the face value. During the 
course of the year, the European Stability Mechanism was created to be a lender of last resort for 
countries in the Eurozone that were struggling. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
was also expanded. The EFSF is a company that aims to “preserve financial stability of Europe’s 
monetary union by providing temporary financial assistance to euro area member states if 
needed” (“European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)”, 2013). The expansion of scope 
included the ability to guarantee commitments for €780 billion by issuing debt instruments and 
intervening in the debt markets (both primary and secondary). In November of 2011, a “grexit” 
was publically declared as a possibility during a summit of G20 leaders, promoting further doubt 
in the stability of Greece. G20 stands for “Group of Twenty” and is a gathering that includes a 
representative from the ECB and European Council as well as finance ministers and central bank 
governors from France, Germany, Italy, and 16 other countries. That same month, George 
Andreas Papandreou resigned as the 11th Prime Minister of Greece, ending his two-year term. It 
was during his term that much of the deception about the budget deficit by the New Democracy 
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party in previous terms was uncovered.  Two days after Papandreou’s resignation, Lucas 
Papademos was sworn in as the interim Prime Minister. The end of the year was accompanied by 
an initial discussion of steps to take towards fiscal integration of the Eurozone by European 
leaders on December 9th, the 20th anniversary of the Maastricht Treaty. There was also 
discussion on extension of loans to over 500 European banks by the European Central Bank in an 
attempt to prevent a credit freeze, making it the largest package of loans in ECB history.  
The stability compact discussed in December of 2011 was finalized on January 30th of 
2012 and was intended to impose fiscal discipline on member states that were in agreement. Of 
the 27 European Union members, 25 agreed to the compact, which was signed on March 2nd. 
All Eurozone countries (including Greece) were required to comply with fiscal unity, but others 
outside of the monetary union had the choice to do so. In February, Greece increased its austerity 
measures, opening the door to a bailout of € 130 billion from the “Troika” of the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Union. The discussion of a 
“grexit” in 2011 resulted in massive withdrawals from Greek banks, €700 million on May 14th 
alone (Ray, 2015). Following still more spending cuts, the New Democracy party had a narrow 
victory on June 17th. In October, the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize due to 
its ability to transform “most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace” (Ray, 
2015). Although the avoidance of war was achieved, economic conflicts were not entirely 
avoided. 
The most notable event in 2013 was the Eurozone’s emergence from the recession with 
GDP growth of 0.3% in August. In the midst of such positive news of the road to recovery for 
the Eurozone, Greece continued fighting the existing austerity in the year 2014. An anti-austerity 
party, Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza), rose to the top, followed by political riots due to the 
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failure to elect a successor for Karolos Papoulias. In the midst of the unrest in Greece, the ECB 
pushed deposit rates down to -0.1%, effectively charging a fee on banks for holding reserves in 
an attempt to spur lending. This marked the first time a major central bank had done this. Rates 
were further cut in September to -0.2%.  
2015 included a continuation of the political unrest that was prevalent in Greece, 
beginning with the election of Alexis Tsipras as Prime Minister, the leader of the Syriza party. 
His election was based on the promise of finding ways around the harsh austerity measures 
Greece was enduring. Despite his negotiations, Tsipras failed to extend Greece’s loans in June, 
resulting in an official default of Greece’s sovereign debt and a suspension of the Athens stock 
exchange on June 30th. Towards the middle of the year it became clear to many Greek citizens 
that Tsipras was unable to block austerity measures while maintaining Greece’s position in the 
union, which resulted in even more protesting. In an attempt to involve the people, Tsipras held a 
controversial referendum in July as to whether Greece would accept the bailout terms provided 
by the Troika. Tsipras had urged Greeks to reject the terms in the referendum. Many believed a 
“no” vote would most definitely result in a “grexit”, however when that “no” vote occurred, to 
many people’s shock, Greece was not forced out of the Eurozone. A bailout package was agreed 
upon just a week later for €86 billion along with more austerity measures, despite the protests. 
The IMF then proceeded to criticize “the terms imposed by its Troika partners, stating that 
Greece’s debt can only be made sustainable by enacting significant debt-relief measures” (Ray, 
2015). In another attempt to put the people in control and discover their true desires, Tsipras held 
a snap election in September. This was yet another risky decision to make in a time of such 
instability, but the decision paid off for him as Tsipras was re-elected, claiming “victory of the 
people.” 
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The situation in Greece will continue to evolve as Eurozone leaders meet routinely to 
discuss fiscal integration as well as further evaluate the causes of the crisis. It is important to note 
that Greece is not solely responsible for the severity of its crisis, although its role was the 
primary focus of this section. Part of the responsibility lies with the monetary union for its failure 
to police (detect and prevent fiscal policy issues before problems arise, such as extreme deficits, 
that would affect the monetary union), as well as with rating agencies that failed to detect trouble 
ensuing from Greece’s decisions and therefore failed to protect investors. Every party involved 
in the debt crisis has a role in its creation and is affected by it and its repercussion. 
 
 
Figure 2. Greece’s Inflation Rate from 1960 to 2016. Inflation has steadily decreased from 1991. 
Copyright 2016 by Trading Economics. 
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Figure 3. Greece’s Gross Domestic Product from 1995 to 2015. A large drop and rebound 
occurred in 2009. Copyright 2016 by Trading Economics. 
 
 
Figure 4. Greece’s Government Spending to GDP from 1995 to 2014. In comparison, Germany’s 
spending has not surpassed 48% of GDP since their admittance into the Eurozone. Copyright 
2016 by Trading Economics. 
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Figure 5. Greece’s Government Debt to GDP from 1980 to 2015. There is a steady increase, 
with the exception of the years leading up to the admittance of Greece into the Eurozone until 
their falsified data was exposed in 2004.  Copyright 2016 by Trading Economics. 
 
 
Figure 6. Greece’s Unemployment Rate from 1998 to 2015. Unemployment increased from the 
end of 2008 until 2014, where it began to gradually decline.  Copyright 2016 by Trading 
Economics. 
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3. Greek Corruption 
Corrupt financial practices by Greece’s public sector were not unique to the crisis, but 
predated it. Corruption data has been available for over two decades and should have been an 
indicator of the financial state of Greece, warned creditors, and provided incentives for Greece to 
start in a new direction.  However, corruption has only now led to the distrust of Greece by other 
countries and investors in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis. This distrust is corrosive when 
negotiating the terms of Greece’s liabilities. Such a lack of faith in Greece’s government stems 
from corrupt practices such as tax evasion and misreporting of financial ratios (debt and deficit 
to GDP ratios). For example, in 2010, 89.5% of total tax receipts in Greece were not collected, 
compared to the 2.3% not collected in Germany (O’Brien, 2015). Indicators like the Corruption 
Perception Index help to inform investors of these corrupt practices through a country’s 
perceived corruption rating. 
Corruption is defined as a “dishonest or illegal behavior, especially by powerful people” 
(“Merriam-Webster”). The Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, hereby 
referred to as the CPI (not to be confused with the Consumer Price Index), is the most widely 
used public sector corruption measure in the world. By using both surveyed perceptions and 
economic and financial records for analysis, a variety of data are gathered to shield against the 
use of unreliable data that may have been corrupted. Perceptions, unlike past records which are 
provided by the government, are less influenced by a possibly corrupt public sector and when 
combined with the other data, can create a better picture of a country’s economic condition. The 
uncovering of Greece’s falsified financial data is a perfect example of tainted data reporting. 
Greece was able to disguise its massive amount of debt with help from Goldman Sachs, which 
assisted its admittance into the EMU (Wienberg, 2011).  
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 The index is a collection of surveys and assessments based on data from the past 24 
months to arrive at a rating. Data sources are “independent institutions specializing in 
governance and business climate analysis” and each country reported must have a minimum of 
three of these sources (“How corrupt is your country?”). Countries are ranked from zero (highly 
corrupt) to 100 (very little to no corruption), although they are often referred to using a scale 
from zero to ten. To put these numbers into perspective, in 2011, corruption scores were 3.4, 3.9, 
8, and 9 for Greece, Italy, Germany, and Finland, respectively.  This shows Greece as the most 
corrupt and Finland as the least within the group. 
In order to standardize the scores of different sources, Transparency International uses a 
software package called STAT to impute scores for sources when the data is not available for a 
country. The credibility of this index was evaluated by the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre in 2012 and they deemed the data to be sufficiently “robust” in the index’s key 
assumptions regarding global parameters. The CPI was also found to have accurately taken 
significant country differences into consideration and have little redundancy (Saisana, 2012). 
Until corruption is addressed and eliminated around the globe, the Corruption Perceptions Index 
will continue to be an important indicator of countries’ economic health and progress.   
Research by Pankaj K. Jain, Emre Kuvvet, and Michael S. Pagano found that there was a 
nonlinear relationship, distinct from other variables such as downgrades or announcements, 
between corruption and foreign investment (Jain et at., 2014). Their research found that 
intermediate levels of corruption result in the greatest negative effect on foreign investment 
when controlling for other factors, a result consistent with our analysis discussed below. This 
proves to be especially relevant for Greece as they fall towards the middle of the Transparency 
International’s CPI rating scale. 
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 In yet another paper discussing the role of corruption in an economy, Carolina Achury, 
Christos Koulovatianos, and John Tsoukalas sought to address the impact of rent-seeking groups 
on sovereign interest rates with the included impact of corruption, through deriving the Markov-
Nash Political Equilibrium. “Our model serves as a tool for demonstrating that corruption is a 
structural problem in a monetary union, needing to be treated as such a type of problem.” 
(Achury et al., 2011). The paper discussed how countries with high debt-to-GDP ratio are likely 
to fall into a high interest rate trap that cannot be fixed with monetary policy if under a monetary 
union. A high interest rate trap is where sufficiently high interest rates keep countries from being 
able to service their debt, resulting in the need to issue additional debt to finance it (perpetually 
increasing debt). This is where a bailout plan comes into play. A bailout attempts to stop the 
cycle by writing off a portion of the debt or lowering the lending rate to reduce the outstanding 
debt-to-GDP ratio. In countries where “rent seeking” is high (rent seekers are those who use 
another person’s resources for their own economic gain without benefiting society, such as 
special-interest groups lobbying to get government funding), there appears to be a large positive 
correlation between corruption and sovereign debt (debt-to-GDP). As a result of the reallocation 
of taxes (expropriation of public resources) to these rent seekers, the impatience for public goods 
and services increases with the misperception that taxes are going to social programs benefiting 
the public instead of to the rent seekers. In order to service these desires, the government issues 
more debt. Sufficient debt pushes interest rates up once more and leads the country into the high 
interest rate trap. The solution that the authors present is that when addressing a corrupt country, 
the goal should be to eliminate rent-seeking groups first. This is because when there are 
structural problems like tax evasion or rent seeking within a country, corruption seeps to the core 
of that country and can’t easily be swept away. Corruption has been linked statistically to 
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increasing debt in other studies such as Chakrabarti and Zeaiter’s examination of the effect of 
political risks on sovereign default (Chakrabarti & Zeaiter, 2014, pg 307). Their study showed 
that an increase in corruption was significantly positively correlated to an increase in sovereign 
debt, a result that is consistent with Jain et al.’s results as well as the case of Greece.  
As can be seen from the literature on the subject, corruption and debt are intertwined and 
feed into one another. Corruption breeds economic instability and only leads a country further 
into debt. With Greece’s CPI rating, everybody should have been aware of the structural 
problems that needed to be addressed far before its admittance into the Eurozone. Even investors 
have been responsible for continuing to lend to Greece, essentially helping it into its 
unsustainable debt levels. Investors, however, were often blind to the possibility of default, with 
their over-reliance on stronger European countries underwriting the debt or on the EMU 
imposing structural reform to prevent default. 
To examine the relationship between corruption and interest rates, a regression was run 
between one-year interest rates and the Corruption Perceptions Index. The results are shown on 
the next page.  
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Table 1 
Regression Analysis on the Effect Changes in CPI have on One-Year Interest Rates 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.60414
R Square 0.36499
Adjusted R Square 0.31614
Standard Error 0.00951
Observations 15
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.00068 0.00068 7.47208 0.01707
Residual 13 0.00118 0.00009
Total 14 0.00185
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.00166 0.00247 0.67282 0.51284 -0.00367 0.00700 -0.00367 0.00700
Changes in Greece's CPI Rank -0.08283 0.03030 -2.73351 0.01707 -0.14830 -0.01737 -0.14830 -0.01737  
The regression is a simplified event analysis, which shows a negative correlation between 
changes in the CPI and Greek interest rates. An event analysis addresses the days leading up to a 
certain event and the days following the event to find any differences that may be caused by the 
event. In this case, the event is the release of the CPI by Transparency International. As a result 
of the inconsistent release date of the CPI each year, little spuriousness has been assumed for the 
sake of a general analysis. The simple regression uses percentage changes in the CPI, calculated 
using the natural log of year t over year t-1 (prior year), against percent changes in the one-year 
interest rates. The ratings were provided by Transparency International and the interest rate data 
were provided by Bloomberg. Although this analysis fails to take many other variables into 
consideration, it supports previous research by finding a negative relationship between 
corruption ratings and investment.  
In addition to the negative correlation found in our regression for Greece, it was also 
discovered that Germany and Italy have a negative relationship between the two variables, but it 
was not found to be statistically significant. Only Greece’s negative correlation between 
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corruption and one-year interest rates were determined statistically significant, as can be seen by 
the p-value of less than 0.05. This exhibits the same behavior as discussed by Jain et al. where 
Greece is neither the most corrupt country, nor the least, and changes in corruption have a 
significant effect (Jain et al., 2014). The spotlight Greece is currently in and the stakes it faces 
with a possible “grexit” place it in a unique situation among EMU countries.  
If Greeks had taken charge to improve their reputation by correcting tax evasion and 
working against rent-seekers, they would have likely fared much better, especially with respect 
to negotiation processes. Instead, Greece backed itself into even more corrupt practices to cover 
up the trap they had fallen into. One example of this was discovered in July of 2003, when 
financial journalist Nick Dunbar revealed Goldman Sachs’ role in hiding Greece’s high 
government deficits, a violation of the Maastricht Treaty, through a series of swaps agreements 
(Dunbar, 2003). The disclosed debt arrangements with Goldman Sachs and continuous revisions 
of Greece’s existing derivatives contracts only further hurt Greece’s standing (Dunbar, 2012). 
Although the derivatives were complex, hiding financial conditions could have and should have 
been prevented. Greece was well aware of its corrupt standing and should have addressed the 
problem before entering a monetary union. 
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Part III: The Negligence of the Parties Involved 
1. The Failure of the EMU to Prevent and Respond to the Debt Crisis 
Although countries such as Germany appear to be picking up the pieces of the mess 
Greece has made, it, like the rest of the monetary union, are at least in part to blame for allowing 
reckless borrowing.  
Koutsoukis (2014) argues:  
The lack of an EU-wide political union is a systemic fault that allowed nearly all of the 
EU economies to stray, more or less, from the Maastricht criteria- not only Greece. This 
important flaw which allows Greece and other weak economies of the Eurozone to 
become highly vulnerable to the markets and subsequently their international positioning 
until the EU institutions become aware to the problem(s) and react accordingly. (p. 30) 
Even in an attempt to help Greece recover through a series of austerity measures and 
bailout packages, the Eurozone may have made the situation worse. The strain put on Greece’s 
economy by the harsh austerity measures diminished growth and made long-term structural 
changes less achievable. Greeks often felt forced to choose whether to live in the economic 
distress caused by harsh austerity measures or be forced out of the Eurozone. This created even 
more international doubt in the stability of Greece. The constant blows to investor confidence 
further limited Greece’s solvency. The International Monetary Fund acknowledged the mistake it 
and the rest of the Troika made of “underestimating how much the austerity measures it pushed 
would pinch the country’s already faltering economy” (Olster, 2013).  The IMF also admitted its 
failure in letting Greek debt remain high for so long. Although, according to the IMF, a success 
of the bailouts was the continued presence of Greece in the Eurozone and the prevention of the 
 35 
spread of the crisis. Despite creditors being partially responsible for Greece’s condition, Greece 
was still responsible for its stalling of structural reforms (privatizations and tax reforms) that 
further worsened their economy.  
Throughout bail-out negotiations, Germany has been on the forefront of the argument for 
increased austerity measures. Many have deemed the sentiment of Germany towards Greece as 
overly harsh. According to former Social Democratic foreign and finance ministers, Frank-
Walter Steinmeier and Peer Steinbrück, Germany appeared to attempt to make the European 
Monetary Union resemble Germany, rather than work towards a “European Germany” (Young, 
2011). The extent of the austerity measures was no longer the decision of the monetary union as 
a whole, but primarily Germany’s standards enforced on others. Germany has such power due to 
its economic strength in relation to the monetary union and its primary role as a creditor. 
European leaders did respond to such doubts about the austerity measures by combining them 
with the restructuring of debt agreements. 
The cultural clash between member countries during the course of the crisis also made a 
huge impact. German citizens, for example, were often “up in arms” about bailing out Greece as 
a result of its poor fiscal discipline. In contrast, Greece blamed attacks on bonds (due to drastic 
drops in credit ratings) and unrealistic austerity measures for their ailments. There also appeared 
to be fear on the part of France to challenge Germany on its positions, as “an open conflict with 
Germany could frighten the markets even more and thus endanger the euro” (Young, 2011). The 
coordination between France and Germany, although helpful for the larger countries, has 
prevented creative solutions and may ultimately hinder the fiscal unity of the entire EMU, and 
possibly force less stable countries out. The vision for political union seen 25 years ago does not 
hold true in the eyes of Germany any more. The generational gap from the World Wars has 
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caused current leaders to be unaware of the devastation caused in the relationships between 
countries during those times that spurred the initial desire for unity. Without the impact of the 
wars resonating with this generation, it has become far easier for European leaders like Angela 
Merkel (Chancellor of Germany) to imagine a politically divided Europe. However, with such 
division a monetary union may not be sustainable. More economically powerful countries may 
decide it is better to band together without the suffering countries or the suffering countries may 
decide the standards imposed by the more powerful countries are too harsh to endure.  
 In his book Boomerang, Michael Lewis (2011) refers to the notion of a two-tier 
European Union as conceived by Wilhelm Nölling, a German politician and economics professor 
at Hamburg University. The first tier would be the countries with similar economic structures, 
such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, and France. The second tier, referred to as 
the “deadbeats”, would be countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. The irony is very 
clear with the European Union receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for “advancing the 
causes of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” yet political tensions 
have formed between the tiers over the course of the crisis (“European Union receives Nobel 
Peace Prize 2012”, 2016). Despite democracy being emphasized in the award, Greece has 
struggled to have its own needs met (and voice heard) by the Eurozone leaders to the same level 
as other member countries, an example being its unemployment rates almost 15% above the 
European average and youth unemployment rates almost 28% above the average in 2014 
(“Unemployment Statistics”, 2015). With Spain in a similar situation, it isn’t hard to argue that 
although the European Union works towards improvements, there are countries that are being 
left in its dust. A survey by Europa indicated “a majority in Greece, Austria, Slovenia, the 
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Netherlands and Sweden disagree that the (Nobel) award was the right choice” (“European 
Union receives Nobel Peace Prize 2012”, 2016). 
This can all be attributed to the inability of the European Monetary Union to prevent the 
crisis from developing and effectively respond to the distress caused by the debt crisis. Further, 
the EMU can be accused of being negligent in their monitoring of member countries to begin 
with. If the fiscal adherence to Maastricht treaty conditions by countries like Greece were to have 
been more strictly policed by the leaders of the EMU, the magnitude of debt accumulation and 
the repercussions may have been significantly reduced. As Mundell predicted, smaller countries 
like Greece would require budgetary discipline and likely fiscal unity. In response to criticisms 
of poor oversight, the EU has worked on reforms to significantly improve their governance. 
These reforms aim to “strengthen enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact, introduce 
greater surveillance of national budgets by the European Commission, and establish an early 
warning mechanism that would prevent or correct macroeconomic imbalances within and 
between member states” (Nelson et al., 2011, p. 18) as well as spur further political integration of 
the EU. 
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2. Rating Agency Recklessness  
The ease at which Greece borrowed was significantly increased with the high credit 
ratings associated with its admittance into the EMU. “We wanted to upgrade the country 
(Greece) on the belief that Greece was now part of the euro zone and that nobody was ever going 
to default and that everything was safe,” Sara Bertin, an economist working at Moody’s, said 
about the discussion to upgrade Greece in 2001 (Creswell & Graham, 2011). The debt levels 
were further supported by the seemingly misplaced optimism in Greece’s sovereign debt position 
by rating agencies until drastic downgrades were made further into the crisis. High credit ratings 
encouraged investment in the country and gave Greece more borrowing opportunities. Many of 
the rating agencies couldn’t imagine the EMU letting a member country reach the point of 
becoming a “deadbeat” (Creswell & Graham, 2011). Even after Greece’s misreported financials 
were recovered, ratings did not immediately change. A leader of Moody’s sovereign debt group 
during the time even commented on the knowledge of the generally inaccurate data produced by 
Greece (Creswell & Graham, 2011). With an existing understanding of the corruption, it is 
almost shocking that Greece was rated so highly until it was uncovered that the rating agencies 
were paid for their ratings to be issued. Without the ratings, Greece would have been unable to 
issue sovereign debt. Although the agencies insist on separation between the ratings process and 
business activities (being paid by the countries they rate), the negligence has brought forth the 
questioning of the authenticity of that statement.  
The unexpected effect the ratings agencies had on the Greek economy as a result of their 
downgrades of Greece’s sovereign debt was a tremendous one. One reflection and determinant of 
confidence is how the debt of a country is rated. The three largest credit rating agencies are 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, all of which can be accused of poorly performing their 
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duties leading up to the crisis. Investors look to these agencies for reliable information on the 
quality and riskiness of debt. They, however, failed to do their due diligence and rated Greek 
debt much higher than deserved for an extended period of time. These agencies appeared to rely 
primarily on the concerns of political leaders for ratings forecasts rather than the economic data 
(Koutsoukis, 2014). Evidence of this is shown in the diminishing economic fundamentals in the 
years leading up to a public announcement of corrupt reporting of financials, but the rating 
agencies delayed revising their rating until the corruption was exposed or even after that, as was 
the case with Moody’s. Until the beginning of the financial crisis, Moody’s spent little attention 
on sovereign debt issues.  
The European Union and European Central Bank asserted “S&P’s April 2010 decision to 
downgrade Greece’s debt to junk status weakened investor confidence, raised the cost of 
borrowing, and made a financial rescue package in May 2010 all but inevitable” (“The credit 
rating controversy”, 2015). This also raises the concern of how informed the ratings agencies are 
staying with respect to perceived corruption. Ratings are determined through analyses of 
financial ratios, credit obligations, and political risks. Anything relevant to the confidence of 
investors in a security is meant to be included in the ratings process, however the unreliable 
ratings during the crisis, have caused the agencies to be questioned. Even Moody’s new 
“methodology” for rating countries that was introduced in 2008, was “more of a checklist” 
without a deep empirical analysis, according to Sara Bertin, the lead analyst on Greece for 
Moody’s until 2008 (Creswell & Graham, 2011). Greece’s sovereign debt was rated as CC+ by 
S&P, Caa3 by Moody’s, and CCC by Fitch in December of 2015 (“Greece | credit rating”, 2015). 
The ratings correspond to being in default with little prospect for recovery. To add perspective, 
in 2002 Moody’s and S&P rated Greek long-term government debt A+, with this investment 
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grade rating continuing until 2009 (Milne, 2010). The drastic drops in credit ratings occurred 
primarily between 2009 and 2010. Moody’s states that “the irrevocable breakdown in relations 
with external creditors” will only continue the poor creditworthiness of Greece and thus will be 
reflected by additional drops in ratings, such as the one on July 1st of last year ("Moody's 
downgrades Greece's government bond rating to Caa3; on review for further downgrade", 2015). 
The agencies cast doubt over whether the situation in Greece will ever improve and create 
concern regarding the toll yet to be taken on the creditors during the journey. These fears are 
likely to materialize in investor expectations of higher yet riskier returns.  
This poor reporting ranges from mortgage back securities (specifically in the US) to the 
sovereign debt crisis. Sara Bertin noted the same issue of over-optimism that contributed to the 
subprime crisis; The rating agencies never conceived of these catastrophes as a possibility 
(Creswell & Graham, 2011).  The proceeding downgrades of European sovereign debt were 
guilty of intensifying or accelerating the crisis. “When you get multiple ratings or large ratings 
downgrades, it is fair to say as a criticism that the ratings were too high in the first place. 
Looking back, that indicates that the assumptions being made in the past were too optimistic,” 
said David H. Levey, co-head of Moody’s sovereign debt group until 2004 (Creswell & Graham, 
2011). In 2010 and 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act was passed and the European Securities and 
Markets Authority was created, respectively, both aiming to shield investors from similar 
negligence in the future. Despite these initiatives, many continue to fight against the immense 
influence these agencies have on investment decisions.  
This is not to say that the investors should be relying solely on these ratings. “In a world 
in which Eurozone countries are increasingly seen as heterogeneous, investors need to 
understand not just budgetary and financial matters but even the internal politics of each nation” 
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(Milne,2010) in order to protect themselves, the responsibility to be well-informed also lies with 
the investor. Investors should be aware of the issues that exist in the country they are investing 
in, such as the corruption perception index and the massive spending and borrowing in Greece. 
Both the reckless investing on the part of investors and the misreporting of the ratings agencies 
contributed to the severity of the crisis. 
 
 
Figure 7. Greece’s 10-Year Government Bond Yields alongside its Average Long-Term Credit 
Rating and the events corresponding to the changes.  Copyright 2015 by Reuters. 
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Part IV: The Implications 
1. If Greece Stays 
As of a bailout achieved on July 13, 2015, Greece’s continued membership in the 
Eurozone now appears far more likely. The Greek government committed to some of the 
difficult austerity measures of increasing value-added tax (a consumption tax), decreasing 
pensions, and increasing retirement age that were treated as tests by its Eurozone partners (Kirby, 
2015). Even with Greece passing this test, that is not an indicator that future tests will have the 
same results. This is especially the case with the Syriza party still in power, which continues to 
promise lessened austerity and a return to Greece’s previous standard of living. More than half of 
Greece’s citizens still believe the euro is good for the country (see Figure 3), meaning they are 
willing to cooperate with the creditors and their austerity measures to maintain it. Figure 4 
depicts some of the strongest Eurozone countries and their opinions on the retention of Greece, 
with a majority in Germany in favor of a “grexit.” Such opposition will only make the monetary 
union harder to maintain. 
Greece staying in the EMU would occur under two separate equilibria, according to 
Jeffrey Frankel (Frankel, 2015). Frankel addressed the situation in Greece through a game theory 
perspective. In order to have Greece stay in the European Monetary Union, Greece or Germany 
would have to give up some of its priorities, a “bad bargain” (someone would have to lose). The 
only other way to achieve a “good bargain” would be for Greece and its creditors to readjust 
their priorities.  This would require creditors being more generous with their terms and Greece 
following through on the promised structural reforms, such as more serious tax reform and 
spending cuts.  
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If Greece were to continue to not fully commit to the structural changes proposed by 
European leaders, this could create increased political strife and discord within Greece. The 
radical left Syriza ran on the promise of decreasing austerity measures and although steps have 
been made towards reform, it has not changed its objective. The Eurozone will have to be very 
cautious in dealing with this government in order to not spark similar radical governments 
forming in countries like Spain. “This political contagion could be very damaging, leading to far 
worse risks than just Greece leaving the Euro” (Elliott, 2015). If austerity were to continue in the 
direction it has been, Greece’s growth will continue to suffer. “Austerity economics was always 
meant as a short, sharp shock, not a coherent economic policy” (Jenkins, 2015). Greece has 
suffered in the last few years and austerity economics does not seem like it will be ending for 
them in the short run. Even if austerity measures were to ease, the Eurozone must create a long-
term solution that unites the extremely diverse group of countries in a sustainable way.  
Another key issue is the continuation of what is referred to as the “Greek brain drain,” in 
which intelligent people migrate out of Greece to richer countries for better wages and lifestyles. 
The ease of migration between Eurozone countries and the common currency (not having to 
worry about exchanging one currency for another in a new location) facilitates the movement. 
There are about 180,000 Greek professionals that choose to work abroad, even more study 
abroad due to the instability of Greece (S.N., 2015). These professionals are young and talented, 
resulting in the remaining residents in Greece on average being older with less innovative 
capabilities. If prospects for Greece do not improve, the “brain drain” will continue as graduates 
and professionals seek out viable career opportunities elsewhere. Many of those still in Greece 
are working in jobs they are extremely overqualified for primarily due to the discouraging work 
environment (S.N., 2015). The same problem might be present if Greece were to separate, but 
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with the prospect for growth, some of the entrepreneurial “brains” may return in hopes of helping 
the country restart. If this outflow of intellectual people to other European countries is to stop, 
Greece will have to work hard to improve its current intellectual prospects by encouraging 
entrepreneurialism and innovation in the business sector.  
There are those who argue that if Greece were to have left the EMU in 2008, the recovery 
for Greece might have gone much smoother on the theory that growth would have been spurred 
as opposed to being hurt. This would be because in response to the economic distress, Greece 
would have the option to use monetary policy to stimulate the economy and not had to endure 
the admittedly overly harsh austerity measures. For the time being, the Chairman of the ECB, 
Mario Draghi, has made his stance very clear based on the ECB’s duty “to act based on the 
assumption that Greece is and will be a member of the euro area” (Kirby, 2015).  
 
Figure 8. A survey conducted by some of the weaker countries within the Eurozone on whether 
they believed the euro was a good thing for their country. Although the percentage of those that 
agree it is beneficial has gone down, most (with the exception of Italy) remain over 50%. 
Copyright 2015 by the Economist. 
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Figure 9. Survey conducted of economically stronger European countries on their opinions of a 
possible “grexit.” The top number in each circle indicates the percentage of the population of that 
country that prefers if Greece stays, the middle is the percentage that prefers it leaves and the 
remainder do not know. A minority for each country believes Greece should remain. Copyright 
2015 by Forbes. 
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2. If Greece Goes 
Since no country has left the Eurozone so far, the process of a “grexit” and the 
consequences following cannot be predicted, but possible results can be considered. Frankel 
(2015) refers to a “grexit” as a consequence of a “non-cooperative equilibrium” where the sides 
are unable to reach an agreement.  Although there are arguments that Greece would be able to 
reestablish a competitive position in the long run through structural changes and improvements 
in its business sector, the short run economic changes that would have to first take place will be 
painful for the Greeks. 
If Greece were to separate from the Eurozone, it would have to either create a new 
currency or revert back to the drachma (more likely the latter). Greece’s first action following a 
secession, would be the devaluation of its new currency. This would help it to refocus on exports 
in the global marketplace as a result of the high import prices. High import prices and relatively 
low purchasing power compared to the rest of the Eurozone would be a result of the weaker 
Greek currency.  The drachma has been predicted to drop in value by 50% or more if adopted 
and monetary policy is increasingly used (D. Mchugh, Feb. 2015). Economists predict Greece’s 
economy would contract 10% within the first year of leaving the Eurozone (D. Mchugh, Feb. 
2015). There is an argument that the focus on domestic goods would strengthen the economy in 
terms of employment and GDP (Koutsoukis, 2014). However, it is important to note that living 
standards may fall as inflation increases. This inflation would likely result from increased 
spending to stimulate the economy (fiscal policy) or financing debt payments by printing money 
(monetary policy). A likely benefit of the weaker drachma would be a boost in the Greek tourist 
industry. 
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Until the currency for the monetarily independent Greece fully replaced the euro, there 
would most likely be large deposit withdrawals of euros to hold onto the stronger currency. To 
prevent the chaos large withdrawals would cause, the government would likely take similar 
actions to freeze accounts that it took in June of 2015 (Blackstone, 2015). Whether Greece would 
be able to borrow is disputed. There are historical cases where countries rising out of debt crises 
are able to borrow at favorable terms (Koutsoukis, 2014). There are also economists who believe 
there will be an adjustment period where borrowing will be greatly limited (“What Would 
Happen if Greece Quits the Euro?”, 2015). This may result in a circulation of “IOU’s,” acting as 
an interim currency during the transition away from the euro. 
In the business sector of Greece, the conversion process from euros to drachmas could 
prove to be chaotic. There would be legal disputes and businesses owing euro-denominated debt 
may be unable to pay their obligations, resulting in insolvency and bankruptcy. This would not 
only hurt Greece’s economy, but any of Greece’s business partners. As for the remaining 
countries in the Eurozone, government spending cuts may result from a fear of a similar loss in 
investor confidence, as mentioned later on, resulting in recessions once more (“What Would 
Happen if Greece Quits the Euro?”, 2015). 
On a larger scale, the “grexit” would affect the outlook on the monetary union as a whole. 
One possible result would be richer countries hesitating in the future towards lending to 
struggling member countries, which could lead to severe economic distress for those countries. 
In the United States, it is unlikely that the Federal government would fail to support a state in 
serious need. If the “grexit” occurs, however, countries like Germany may be willing to let other 
members suffer through it. Additionally, just as a moral hazard problem exists from third parties 
like Germany and the ECB backing Greece’s debt leading to expectations about future support, 
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an example may be set of the repercussions of poor fiscal discipline if Greece were to leave. The 
separation of countries, no matter their condition, results in further speculation over the fragility 
of the Eurozone. If Greece were to exit and do well, countries may consider following its 
footsteps if times become difficult in the monetary union due to asymmetric shocks. This is 
especially likely for countries such as Spain and Portugal that already have anti-austerity 
movements.  
 The other possible result is a more beneficial one for the Eurozone (though not for 
Greece), in which the monetary union thrives while Greece suffers, thereby showing the 
consequences of fiscal irresponsibility. This could act as a “lesson” for countries such as Italy 
and Spain, which have followed similar debt patterns. If fiscal discipline were to follow, it could 
further unify the remaining countries into a stronger monetary union. Another probable result 
would be that people in vulnerable Eurozone countries would move their money to safer 
countries like Germany to avoid similar hardships as Greece (“What Would Happen if Greece 
Quits the Euro?”, 2015).  As mentioned earlier, the responsibility for the crisis does not fall 
solely on Greece’s financial negligence, but on its creditors as well for feeding into the debt. 
Countries such as Germany and France may experience large losses in investor confidence as a 
result of their inability to respect existing economic systems of weaker countries without 
enforcing their own (“What Would Happen if Greece Quits the Euro?”, 2015), though some 
economists argue that the effects would be more political than financial (D. Mchugh, Feb. 2015).  
 Of course there is no way to know for certain the repercussions of a “grexit.” The added 
possibility of Greece leaving not only the European Monetary Union, but the European Union 
increases the confusion. Although the ECB declared in 2009 that maintaining a position in the 
EU after leaving the EMU would be “legally impossible,” if the EU wanted Greece’s 
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membership enough there would be measures taken to do so (“What Would Happen if Greece 
Quits the Euro?”, 2015). The European Commission and the Eurogroup, an informal body of 
European leaders, have also assured their ability to handle the “fallout of a Grexit” (Saeedy, 
2015): 
“The stability of the euro area is not in question,” said Valdis Dombrovskis, 
Commissioner for the Euro, on Monday. “We have everything we need to manage the 
situation. We have a banking union to ensure the stability of the financial sector. We have 
[the European Stability Mechanism] to help the most vulnerable economies. The ECB is 
using its tools to ensure stability.” 
Regardless of whether Greece maintains it membership in the monetary union or not, the 
lessons learned by the sovereign debt crisis can be applied to future incidents inside the EMU as 
well as to other monetary unions. Although much of the blame has been placed on Greece for the 
crisis, there were others to blame such as the creditors and the ratings agencies. Each party will 
also feel the repercussions of this crisis in either scenario (whether Greece stays or goes).  One 
recommendation for the Eurozone members is to focus more on a founding core principal of the 
monetary union: Unity (both political and fiscal). In the midst of all of the fiscal and cultural 
differences, the reason behind the EMU is often forgotten. As one of the trade centers of the 
world, European countries are at an advantage and could very well rival the dollar as a primary 
reserve currency in the future if the members work harder at coordination efforts. Every country 
felt the crisis, but also had to “pick up the bill” for Greece. The key here is that because each 
entity is a part of a monetary union, they now make up a body of interdependent economies and 
should treat economic policy and political relations as such. Even though Όλα καλά is not likely 
to be heard any time soon, if the European Monetary Union uses these past few years to guide 
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future decisions and member countries work harder to structurally change (i.e. Greece working 
to address its corruption issues), maybe someday it will be.  
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